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Abstract
In this paper we investigate whether local governments react on the welfare
bene￿t levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own bene￿t levels.
We solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game by utilizing a
policy intervention; more speci￿cally, we use a centrally geared exogenous place-
ment of a highly welfare prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities
as an instrument. The IV estimates indicate that there exists a "race-to-the-
bottom" and that the e⁄ect is economically as well as statistically signi￿cant; if
the neighboring municipalities decrease their welfare bene￿t level with 100 SEK,
a municipality decreases its bene￿t level with approximately 59 SEK. This result
is robust to several alternative model speci￿cations.
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11 Introduction
In the wake of the major welfare reforms that took place in the United States in the
1990s, there has been a growing interest in empirical work on strategic interactions
among local governments in the setting of welfare bene￿t levels. The increased interest
stems from a fear of a "race-to-the-bottom" (RTB) in the setting of welfare bene￿t
levels.1
The most direct test of the existence of a RTB2 in the setting of welfare bene-
￿t levels is to test for strategic interactions among local governments.3 What one




!ijBj + Xi￿ + "i (1)
where Bi is the bene￿t level in local government i, Bj is the bene￿t levels in other
local governments j, j 6= i, !ij are weights that indicate the importance attached by
local government i to bene￿ts in the other local governments, Xi is a vector of socio-
economic and demographic characteristics for local government i with the associated
parameter vector ￿, and "i is the error term. The parameter of interest, ￿, represents
the slope of the local government￿ s reaction function. If ￿ is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero, then strategic interaction occurs between a given local government and other
local governments that have not been assigned a weight of zero.4 The econometric
problem in estimating equation (1) is that the bene￿t levels on the right-hand-side
are endogenous variables since the bene￿t levels in all localities are jointly determined
when strategic interactions occur.
Earlier empirical work in this area have found a positive and statistically signi￿cant
estimate of ￿ (see, e.g., Saavedra (2000) and Figlio, Kolpin and Reid (1999)). The
existing empirical work does however su⁄er from di⁄erent potential drawbacks, all
1Apart from the main reform in the U.S. in 1996, there were several state waivers enacted in the
￿rst part of the 1990s. As a consequence of the reforms, there was a highly increased decentralization
of responsibilities for the welfare system to the state level, implying an increased probability for
strategic interaction among the states to take place.
2Even though it is likely to overstate the issue, we will follow the earlier literature and use the
phrase "race-to-the-bottom" as a convenient shorthand description of the phenomenon of interest
(while the theory only points to a downward bias in welfare bene￿ts caused by a concern about
welfare migration, popular usage of the phrase sometimes have the meaning of a much more dire
outcome).
3A RTB in the setting of welfare bene￿t levels can materialize if there are strategic interactions
among local jurisdictions; if local government decision makers perceive, correctly or not, that generous
bene￿ts attract welfare migrants, this may make jurisdictions reluctant to o⁄er generous bene￿ts
because it may increase the number of program participants and thus the total cost of providing a
given level of bene￿ts. As a result, welfare bene￿ts may be lower than the socially desirable level.
4Another, more indirect, way of investigating if there is a RTB is to examine if there exists any
welfare migration. Excellent surveys of the earlier research on welfare migration can be found in
Brueckner (2000) and Meyer (2000).
2related to the identi￿cation of the interaction parameter.
When estimating models of strategic/social interactions between di⁄erent types of
agents, it is important to consider the distinction between endogenous and exogenous
interactions, as discussed by, e.g., Manski (1993) and Mo¢ tt (2001). Endogenous
interactions are transmitted through the outcome variable (that is, in our case, the
welfare bene￿t levels) while exogenous interactions are transmitted through the other
municipalities￿characteristics other than their welfare bene￿t levels (that is, if exoge-
nous interactions are present, a municipality￿ s welfare bene￿t level will be a⁄ected
by other municipalities￿characteristics other than their welfare bene￿t levels). The




!ijBj + Xi￿ + Xj￿ + "i (2)
where Xj is a vector of socio-economic and demographic characteristics for the other
local governments. As is discussed and shown by Mo¢ tt (2001), without a policy
intervention (through randomized trials or some non-experimental counterpart), it is
impossible to identify endogenous and exogenous interactions separately.
As argued in Mo¢ tt (2001), many studies in the literature on social interactions
try to overcome this problem by imposing the restriction that only one form of inter-
action is at work, thereby obtaining identi￿cation. However, if the assumed form of
interaction is incorrect, the resulting estimates are either biased or misinterpreted. If,
for example, exogenous interactions are assumed to be zero when they are not, and
the model is estimated by two-stage least squares in which the characteristics of the
other regions are used as instruments, then we get biased estimates of the coe¢ cient
on the endogenous social interaction variable (that is, in our case, of the reaction func-
tion coe¢ cient). Similar problems arise if the endogenous interactions are assumed to
be zero when they are not, implying that the model is estimated by regressing a re-
gion￿ s bene￿t level only on its own characteristics and the characteristics of the other
regions. To be able to identify the two channels separately, we must hence control
for both the other municipalities￿welfare bene￿t levels and the characteristics of the
other municipalities while we at the same time use a policy intervention to solve the
simultaneity problem.
The aim of this paper is to estimate equation (2); that is, to investigate whether
local governments react to the welfare bene￿t levels in neighboring jurisdictions when
setting their own bene￿t levels, allowing for endogenous as well as exogenous interac-
tions. Our main contribution is that we propose and use a policy intervention to solve
the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game. More speci￿cally, we utilize
an exogenous variation that was provided by a policy intervention in Sweden in the
late 1980s and early 1990s as an instrument; a centrally geared exogenous placement
3of a highly welfare prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities. Using a
policy intervention to identify endogenous and exogenous interactions is an approach
that has never been used before in the literature on welfare competition, and, ac-
cording to Mo¢ tt (2001), is an approach that is seldom, if ever, used in general in
empirical work on social interactions.
Our IV estimates indicate that there exists a "race-to-the-bottom" and that the
e⁄ect is economically as well as statistically signi￿cant; if the neighboring municipal-
ities decrease their welfare bene￿t level with 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its
bene￿t level with approximately 59 SEK. This result is robust to several alternative
model speci￿cations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
potential problems with the earlier empirical work. Section 3 analyzes the policy
intervention within a theoretical framework, section 4 presents the policy intervention,
section 5 describes the data and the empirical speci￿cation, and section 6 provides
the regression results. A detailed sensitivity analysis is given in section 7 and, ￿nally,
section 8 concludes.
2 Earlier empirical work
The existing literature on strategic interactions can be classi￿ed into two types of
studies, depending on the type of potential drawback they may su⁄er from. The
￿rst type of studies have assumed that there are no exogenous interactions, while the
second type of studies have assumed that there are no endogenous interactions.
An example of the ￿rst type of studies is Figlio et al. (1999). They use a panel
of U.S. state-level data over the period 1983-1994 to examine the degree to which
states simultaneously set their welfare bene￿t levels. In order to do so, they esti-
mate an equation that is very similar to equation (1), but where they also control for
state-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, time dummies, and the states￿characteristics (but not the
characteristics of neighboring states). To break the simultaneity, they use instrumen-
tal variables technique, using characteristics of the neighboring states as instruments
(more speci￿cally, they use the neighbor states￿female unemployment rate, the neigh-
bor states￿ratio of females to employed males, and the neighbor states￿average weekly
wages in variety stores). They ￿nd substantial empirical evidence supporting the no-
tion that states set welfare bene￿t levels interdependently; their results indicate that
a state is expected to change its bene￿t levels by 90 cents when neighboring states
change their bene￿t levels by one dollar. Their IV estimate is more than ￿ve times as
large as their OLS estimate (i.e., when the endogeneity of the neighboring states wel-
fare bene￿t level is neglected). In addition, they ￿nd that state responses to neighbor
bene￿t decreases tend to be signi￿cantly larger in magnitude than their responses to
4neighbor bene￿t increases. As noted above, their choice of instruments are however
problematic if there are exogenous interactions, implying that their estimates might be
biased.5 In other words, in the presence of exogenous interactions, the municipalities￿
characteristics should be included as control variables, not as instruments.
Estimating a reduced form speci￿cation, using spatial econometric methods, Saave-
dra (2000) is another example of a study that assumes that there are no exogenous
social interactions. The analysis is conducted on separate cross-sections as well as on
pooled data (U.S. data for the years 1985, 1990, and 1995), where in the latter case
state-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are controlled for. As in Figlio et al. (1999), the results
suggest that the states behave strategically when they set their welfare bene￿t levels;
the estimated slope parameter of the reaction function is positive and signi￿cant.6
Assuming that there are no endogenous interactions, Smith (1991) is an example
of the second type of studies. Using a single cross-section (1979 U.S. data), she uses
only the rival states￿characteristics as explanatory variables (and not their bene￿t
levels). By estimating such a model, Manski (1993) has shown that the existence
of social interactions is in general identi￿ed. If the coe¢ cients for the other regions￿
characteristics are signi￿cant, then either one, or both, of the two types of interactions
must be signi￿cant (but we cannot disentangle their separate roles). Smith ￿nds that
distance matters; it is only close states￿(within 750 miles) that engage in a bene￿t-
setting game.
3 Theoretical framework
To organize our thoughts on the problem, we will use the theoretical setup presented in
Brueckner (2000), building on work by Brown and Oates (1987) and Wildasin (1991).
In the ￿rst three parts of this section, we present the model and use it to discuss
what type of policy intervention one could use in order to solve the simultaneity
problem arising from the welfare game. Then, in the last part of the section, we
analyze how the proposed policy intervention a⁄ects the welfare game and examine
under what circumstances it can be considered as a suitable instrument for solving
the simultaneity problem.
5The same type of instruments are also used by Hernes Fiva and Rattsł (2003) when testing for
strategic interactions among Norwegian local governments.
6Saavedra uses di⁄erent weighting schemes when estimating the reaction function, also allowing
non-neighboring states to have positive weights. Most of her results do however suggest that state
choices of bene￿t levels depend on choices in contiguous states, while they in most cases seem to
be independent of the chosen bene￿t levels in non-contiguous states. Hence, it seems like strategic
interactions mainly take place among states that share border.
53.1 General setup
The model economy contains two regions: A and B. In each region there are M non-
poor consumers, referred to as ￿rich￿ , who are immobile across states. The economy
contains 2N poor consumers, who work at low-paying jobs as well as receive welfare
bene￿ts from the region where they reside. The poor are assumed to be mobile
across regions, with zero migration costs. There are NA poor people in region A and
NB = 2N ￿ NA in region B.
The wages of the poor are determined in a competitive labor market, and thus
re￿ ect the marginal productivity of unskilled labor. Suppose that the output of region
i depends on the amount Ni of unskilled labor along with other ￿xed factors (such
as land and capital), f(Ni). The wage of a region is hence equal to wi = f0(Ni) We
assume that f is strictly concave, which implies that the wage falls as the unskilled
labor pool grows; w0(Ni) ￿ f00(Ni) < 0. Wages in the two regions are then given by
wA = w(NA) and wB = w(NB). Letting BA and BB denote the welfare bene￿ts paid
to the poor, the total income of a poor resident equals w(NA) + BA in region A and
w(NB) + BB in region B.
Each region￿ s welfare bene￿t level is chosen by its rich residents, who care about
the well-being of the local poor (through interdependent preferences). We assume
that the rich in both regions have the same utility function: U(xi;wi +Bi), i = A;B,
where xi gives consumption expenditure for the rich in region i. For simplicity, the
utility function is assumed to be quasi-linear, that is
U(xi;wi + Bi) = xi + V (wi + Bi); i = A;B (3)
where V is increasing and strictly concave in wi + Bi.
Letting y denote the income of the rich, which is assumed to be the same in both
regions, the budget constraint of a rich resident is given by
xi = y ￿
NiBi
M
; i = A;B (4)
The bene￿t level of the region is thus chosen to maximize equation (3) with respect
to the bene￿t level, such that the budget restriction in equation (4) holds.
We will start by brie￿ y looking at the no mobility case, before turning to the more
interesting case in which the poor are allowed to move between the regions.
3.2 The no-mobility case
In the no-mobility case, solving the maximization problem for the optimal bene￿t
level of region A yields the following ￿rst order condition:
MV￿ (wA + BA) = NA (5)
6The condition states that the rich of the region set the bene￿t levels so that the
sum of their marginal utilities of the poor￿ s income, is equal to the marginal cost of
increasing the poor￿ s incomes through increasing bene￿ts. The ￿rst order condition
is hence a Samuelsson condition for the provision of a public good.
3.3 The mobility case
If we allow the poor to move between the regions, the analysis becomes slightly more
complicated. Solving the maximization problem in the presence of welfare migration
implies that the rich of region A choose the welfare bene￿t level taking account of
the fact that an increase in BA raises NA through welfare migration. The regions
thus play a Nash welfare game, with the rich in region A viewing region B￿ s welfare
bene￿t level, BB, as ￿xed in making their own choice.
In order to derive an internal migration equilibrium, i.e. in order to avoid a
situation where all poor individuals move to the region with the marginally higher
bene￿t level, we need to put some constraint on migration. In this model setup, the
assumption that wages depend negatively on the number of poor residents provides
such a constraint.7 Migration equilibrium is achieved when the total income of the
poor is equalized between the two regions, i.e. when the following expression holds:
w(NA) + BA = w(NB) + BB (6)
By maximizing equation (3) with respect to BA subject to equation (4), and
allowing NA to vary, we obtain the following ￿rst order condition for the bene￿t level
of region A:






By comparing equation (7) with the ￿rst order condition in the no-mobility case,
equation (5), we easily see that the optimal bene￿t level is lower in the presence of
migration. Two e⁄ects contribute to this: First, since increases in the bene￿t level
now cause welfare migration, a marginal increase in the bene￿t level will increase
total costs more than in the no mobility case. We call this the "cost e⁄ect". Second,
bene￿t increases are less productive when the poor are mobile. The reason is that
the induced welfare inmigration has a negative e⁄ect on the local wage, which partly
o⁄sets the increase in the local poor￿ s income. We denote this the "wage e⁄ect".
Our main interest, however, lies in the interaction between the bene￿t levels of the
regions, i.e. in the bene￿t level reaction functions. In order to simplify the derivation
of these, following Brueckner (2000), we assume simple quadratic functional forms
7This assumption is not crucial to the qualitative results, but could be replaced by other assump-
tions that constrain the migration elasticity of the poor, for example idiosyncratic moving costs or
regional preferences (see for example Smith (1991) or Wheaton (2000)). The wage assumption has
the advantage of being straightforward and easy to analyze.
7for utility and production. Speci￿cally, we assume that U(xi;wi + Bi) = xi + ￿(wi +
Bi) ￿ 1
2￿(wi + Bi)2 with ￿;￿ > 0, and that f(Ni) = ￿Ni ￿ 1
2￿N2
i , with ￿;￿ > 0,
which gives w(Ni) ￿ f0(Ni) = ￿ ￿ ￿Ni.
By applying these functional forms and by combining the ￿rst order condition in
equation (7) with the migration equilibrium constraint in equation (6), we can solve
for BA as a function of BB:




where ￿ is a constant.
Equation (8) shows the interaction between the bene￿t levels of neighboring re-
gions. By using the quadratic functional forms to solve for BA(NA) in equation (7),
we ￿nd that the following holds8:
> 0 < 0
@BA
@BB = 0 iff @BA
@NA = 0
< 0 > 0
; (9)
We see that, in this theoretical framework, we can expect some interaction between
the bene￿t levels, unless we have the knife-edge case of zero-sloping reaction functions.
The sign of the reaction functions depends on whether the "cost e⁄ect" or the "wage
e⁄ect" dominates: if the cost e⁄ect is larger than the wage e⁄ect, we have positively
sloped reaction functions; if they exactly balance, we have a zero slope; and if the
wage e⁄ect is larger, the reaction functions have a negative slope.9
In empirical work, equation (8) is typically estimated through an equation similar
to the one given in equation (1). Since the welfare bene￿t levels in the two regions are
determined simultaneously, there is however a simultaneity problem to be solved. In
order to do this, we would, generally speaking, like to have a variable that is exoge-
nously distributed among the regions and that a⁄ects the setting of welfare bene￿t
levels in one of the regions but that does not directly a⁄ect the corresponding levels
in the neighboring region (i.e., we need a variable that shifts the reaction function of
one region but not that of the other).
The theoretical analysis just laid out shows that one variable that is likely to a⁄ect
the setting of welfare bene￿ts in a region is the in￿ ow of welfare prone individuals
to that region (c.f. equation (9)). This suggests that an exogenous increase in the
number of poor in a region could be used to instrument for the bene￿t level. If
one could ￿nd a social program or a policy intervention that generates an exogenous
8The model setup is symmetric, so the corresponding holds for BB.
9It is hence the "wage e⁄ect", or the assumption that wages depend negatively on the number
of poor in the region, that lies behind the possibility of negatively or zero sloped reaction functions
in this model setup. This scenario is not unrealistic. We can think of other mechanisms that would
yield the same result, for example including housing costs of the poor in the model, and letting these
increase in the number of poor in the region.
8placement of a welfare prone group in the regions, that program or policy intervention
could be used as an instrument to solve the simultaneity problem arising in equation
(8).
We argue that such a policy intervention existed in Sweden in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, in the form of an exogenous placement of refugees. The aim of this paper
is to use this policy intervention as an instrument to break the simultaneity problem
arising from the welfare game. What is required for the policy intervention to be a
valid instrument? To examine this, we will next analyse the policy intervention within
the theoretical framework.
3.4 An analysis of a policy intervention
What e⁄ect will a policy intervention that leads to an exogenous increase in the
number of welfare prone individuals in one of the regions, have on the welfare bene￿t
levels in the two regions? In this section, we will analyze such a policy intervention
within the theoretical framework presented above. We will call the individuals that
are placed in one of the regions "refugees". In order to keep the section short and
simple, we will assume positively sloping reaction functions.10
The refugee placement program can be described as a 3-stage game between re-
gions A and B. We assume that only region B receives refugees, in order to derive
how this a⁄ects the bene￿t levels of the two regions. (That is, we view region B as the
"neighbor" and investigate how a change in its bene￿t level a⁄ects the bene￿t level
in region A.) We furthermore assume that the refugees are poor (i.e., that they are
welfare recipients). Unlike the native poor, however, we assume that the refugees do
not work. This implies that the migration constraint of the refugees di⁄ers from that
of the native (working) poor. We do not explicitly model any migration constraint
mechanism for the refugees, but start by assuming that the refugees are immobile
between the regions, and then analyse what happens if this assumption is relaxed.
In order to be able to separate between the arriving refugees and the "native
poor", we change the notation of the native poor of region i to ^ Ni, and use ￿ Ni to
denote the refugees of region i.
3.4.1 Case 1: Refugees immobile between the regions
Stage 0: We start in a stable equilibrium, where the bene￿t levels of the regions
satisfy the ￿rst order conditions in the mobility case, and the migration equilibrium
of the native poor, equation (10), is ful￿lled. The bene￿t level of region i hence
10The points to be made in this section do not rest on this assumption, but hold for the model in
general.
9satis￿es:
MV 0(wi + Bi) =
^ Ni + @ ^ Ni
@BiBi
1 + w0( ^ Ni)@ ^ Ni
@Bi
and
w( ^ Ni) + Bi = w(2 ^ N ￿ ^ Ni) + Bj (10)
Stage 1: At stage one, the refugees, ￿ NB, are placed in region B. The increase
in the number of poor of the region increases the total bene￿t costs of the rich of
region B. The in￿ ow of refugees hence changes the budget constraint of the rich (see
equation (4)) to also include the cost of the immigrants.







The wage level is, however, una⁄ected by the refugee placement, since the refugees
do not work. This also implies that the migration constraint of the native poor,
equation (10), is unchanged. Assuming that the rich of a region care only about the
native poor, we can rewrite the utility function of the rich in region B as11:






+ V (w( ^ NB) + BB) (12)
How does the refugee placement a⁄ect the bene￿t levels of the regions? This
depends on our assumption regarding the mobility of the refugees. The assumption
that the refugees are immobile between the regions introduces an asymmetry in the
model, since the refugees are placed only in region B. The optimal bene￿t level of
region B after the refugee placement is derived by maximizing equation (12) with
respect to the bene￿t level and such that equation (10) holds. The resulting ￿rst
order condition for region B is given by:
￿














= 0 = ￿1 (13)
By di⁄erentiating equation (13) with respect to BB and ￿ NB, we obtain the e⁄ect of









We see that the optimal bene￿t level of region B, given the bene￿t level of region A,
is lower after the refugee placement. This implies a downward shift in the reaction
curve of region B:s bene￿t level (see Figure 1).
11This assumption implies that the refugees only enter as a cost in the utility of the rich. This,
together with the assumption that the poor immigrants do not work, ensures a negative e⁄ect on
the bene￿t level in region B of the refugee placement.
12We know that ￿1




M < 0 is easily seen from equation (13).
10Stage 2: At stage 2 region A responds to the decrease in BB. Since no refugees
have been placed in region A, the ￿rst order condition for the bene￿t provision of
region A is equal to that of Stage 0. However, the bene￿t decrease of region B
a⁄ects region A, since it makes some working poor from region B move to region A.
Assuming linear reaction functions with a positive slope, the e⁄ects of the refugee
placement in region B on the bene￿t levels of the two regions can be illustrated by
the reaction functions in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Reaction functions, No refugee mobility
In Figure 1 we see that the bene￿t levels of both regions are lower after the
refugee placement. The mechanisms are the following: In the ￿rst stage, the reaction
function of region B, RB, shifts, because the regions￿optimal level of bene￿t is now
lower, given the bene￿t level of region A. In the second stage, region A reacts to
the bene￿t decrease of its neighbor, by lowering its bene￿t level. The e⁄ect on BA
is hence channeled through BB and corresponds to a movement along the reaction
function of A, RA, in the ￿gure. As Figure 1 shows, the decrease is larger for the
bene￿t level of region B.
3.4.2 Case 2: Allowing the refugees to move
Figure 1 describes the case when the refugees are assumed to be immobile between
the regions. What happens if we relax this assumption?
The assumption of immobile refugees introduced an asymmetry in our otherwise
symmetric model. This asymmetry results in di⁄erent optimal bene￿t levels of the
11regions. In addition, and more importantly for the empirical part of this paper, the
assumption of immobile refugees assures that all the e⁄ect of the refugee placement
in region B on the bene￿t level in region A, is transmitted through the change in the
bene￿t level in region B. This is important for the validity of the refugee placement
as an instrument for the bene￿t level.
If we instead assume that the refugees are perfectly mobile, we are back in a
symmetric model. The intuition behind this is the following: If the migration of
the refugees is perfectly elastic, it does not matter in which region they are initially
placed, but they will "immediately" move to the region with the higher bene￿t level.
The increase in the total bene￿t costs will be shared equally between the regions, and
we will hence see equal shifts in the reaction functions, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Reaction functions, Perfect refugee mobility
We have now illustrated how the interaction between the bene￿t levels of the
regions work in two polar cases regarding the mobility among the placed refugees.
The conclusion from this analysis is that the validity of a policy intervention, that
exogenously places individuals in certain regions, as an instrument for breaking the
simultaneity in the welfare game or not, crucially hinges on the migration pattern of
the placed individuals.
124 The policy intervention: Exogenous placement of
refugees
This section will describe the main characteristics of the refugee placement program
and discuss the appropriateness of using it as an instrument for breaking the simul-
taneity problem in the welfare game.
4.1 Description of the refugee placement program
The system of non-voluntary placement of refugees was in place between the beginning
of 1985 and the ￿rst of July 1994. The assignment of refugees to the municipalities
was coordinated by The Immigration Board through municipality-wise contracts. The
purpose of the program was to achieve a more even distribution of refugees over the
country, or more speci￿cally, to break the concentration of immigrants to larger towns.
Initially, only a fraction of the municipalities were contracted, but as the number of
refugees soared in the late 1980s and early 1990s, so did the number of receiving
municipalities. In 1991, 277 out of 286 municipalities had agreed to participate.
The original ambition was to direct the ￿ ow of immigrants toward municipalities
with good future prospects in terms of labor market conditions and education possi-
bilities. The increasing in￿ ow of immigrants combined with the shortage of housing
during the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s meant, however, that these
ambitions had to give way to the more immediate concern of available housing.
The municipalities received ￿nancial compensation, paid out by the Immigration
Board, for the refugee placement. Compensation was paid out gradually, during the
year of placement and the 3 following years, to compensate for the running expenses
of the receiving municipality. The larger part of the expenditures consisted of welfare
bene￿t payments. In 1991, the system was replaced by one where the municipalities
were given a lump sum grant for each refugee. The grant was paid out during the
year of the placement, and was estimated to cover the expenses of the municipality
for about 3,5 years. In addition to the grant, the municipalities had the possibility
to apply for compensation for "extraordinary costs" for the refugee placement, for
example for old or disabled refugees that were in need of special care.13
The refugees were allowed to move immediately after the placement. Under the
system with running expenses, the compensation was tied to the refugee, i.e. it was
provided to the new municipality in case of migration. This was not the case under
the lump sum system, where the municipality of placement received the entire sum, no
matter how long the refugee stayed in the municipality. If the refugee did move within
13This system was in place until 1996. From 1996 the compensation is in the form of a lump sum,
but it is paid out gradually during a 2-year period. (The Immigration Board (1997, pp22f))
13two years after placement, the new municipality also received some compensation.14
4.2 Using the refugee placement program as an instrument for
the bene￿t level
We will use the policy intervention de￿ned by the refugee placement program between
1986 and 1991 to instrument for the rival municipalities￿welfare bene￿t levels in 1990-
1994.15 In order to motivate that the refugee placement program is an appropriate
instrument, we need to discuss the exogeneity of the refugee placement program. In
addition, we need to show that it is reasonable to believe that the placement of refugees
in a municipality a⁄ected the bene￿t level of that municipality, but not directly the
bene￿t levels of the rival municipalities.
Regarding the exogeneity of the program placement, what is important for our
analysis, is that the refugee placement was exogenous from the point of view of the
municipalities. The period we study is characterized by a couple of circumstances
that we argue support this claim.16
First, during the time period we use, the number of refugees arriving to Sweden
increased dramatically. During 1986-91 on average over 16,000 refugees arrived each
year (peaking in 1989 at 24,879), compared to a yearly average of just above 5,000
during the previous six years. This made it harder for the municipalities to refuse to
accept the Immigration Board￿ s refugee placement proposals; the refugees had to be
placed somewhere, and with the increasing in￿ ow, all municipalities had to share the
responsibility for this. Interviews with persons that were in charge of the placement
also con￿rms that it was a high degree of solidarity among the municipalities and
that the municipalities generally accepted program participation, especially during
the early years of the placement program.17 In addition, some of the municipalities
that did refuse, received a lot of negative publicity for this.
Second, refusals to accept refugee placement were in fact very rare. Only 5 out
of the 281 municipalities in our data refused to receive any refugees at all during the
period we study. We believe it likely that the decision to refuse refugee placement
was connected to municipality-speci￿c parameters that stay relatively ￿xed over time,
such as ideology.
14One previous study uses the refugee placement program as a natural experiment, Edin, Fredriks-
son and ¯slund (2003). They study the consequences of the program placement for the labor market
participation of the refugees and use data for 1987-91. The paper provides a detailed description of
"the handling of a typical asylum seeker from the border to the ￿nal placement".
15According to Edin et al. (2003) the refugee placement program was more strictly implemented
during this initial period of the program, than during the later years.
16There is very little written documentation on this topic. The information provided here is there-
fore based on two di⁄erent sources; on the written information and on interviews with government
o¢ cials that were implementing the program.
17It can be noted that the instruments we use are from the early years of the placement program.
14Apart from the fact that the program must be exogenous from the municipali-
ties￿point of view, it is also important that the Immigration Boards￿ s placement of
refugees was not guided by certain characteristics in the municipalities that were also
correlated with the welfare bene￿t levels. Interviews with government o¢ cials that
were implementing the program suggest that if there was any factor that a⁄ected the
refugee placement, it had to do with the availability of housing in the municipalities.
The reason for this is that the period under study is characterized by a very tight
housing market. This means that if any factor, except for ￿xed municipality-speci￿c
characteristics, did in￿ uence the refugee placement, it was probably the availability
of housing.18
Based on these circumstances, we argue that the refugee placement can be viewed
as exogenous from the point of view of the municipalities, conditional on housing
vacancies and on municipality-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects.
Another criteria for using the refugee placement program as an instrument for the
bene￿t levels, is that the program actually a⁄ects these. A ￿rst prerequisite for this
is that the program leads to an increase in the number of welfare prone individuals
and that this increase, in turn, implies increased costs for the municipalities.
When placed in a municipality, the refugee was supported by welfare bene￿ts
during a period of introductory Swedish courses, and after that until he/she had
found other maintenance. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, during an initial
period, the larger part of the refugees received social assistance. The municipalities
were compensated for this, during the ￿rst part of the period we study through the
compensation for running expenses during three years, and from 1991 on, through
a lump sum grant that was to cover the expenses for a corresponding period. The
question is whether this compensation was enough, i.e. whether the refugees had
moved out of welfare when the compensation ended or not.
Looking at the data, we ￿nd it likely that the refugee placement did increase
the pool of welfare dependent inhabitants in a municipality. Refugees, as well as
foreign citizens in general, are overrepresented in the data on welfare recipients. Over
the period 1990-1994, refugee households made up on average 11 percent, and non-
Swedish citizens in general (including refugees) 26 percent, of the welfare-receiving
households, while the fraction of refugees and the fraction of foreign citizens (including
refugees) in the population during the same period roughly equalled 1 and 6 percent
respectively.19
18This claim is supported by various studies that argue that the high unemployment rates among
immigrants from 1980 and onwards are partially due to the fact that housing, instead of factors such
as labor market prospects, has been determining the refugee placement (see for example Edin et al.,
2003).
19Based on data from Statistics Sweden and the Migration Board. A person is de￿ned as a refugee
during the year of receiving a residence permit and the three following years. After that he/she is
15These ￿gures may however merely represent the fact that the refugees are sup-
ported by welfare during an initial period in the country, for example during the
period of mandatory introductory Swedish courses. For us to be able to use the
refugee placement as an instrument, i.e. for the refugee placement to a⁄ect the costs
of the receiving municipalities, we need a signi￿cant number of the refugees to stay
on welfare also after the termination of the ￿nancial compensation scheme.
FranzØn (2004) analyzes welfare dependency among immigrants, based on inter-
views conducted in 1996 with refugee immigrants that arrived in Sweden between
1980 and 1989. Of the immigrants in the sample, 24 percent are recipients of wel-
fare bene￿ts after 7-16 years in Sweden. In comparison, the share of welfare bene￿t
recipients in the population in general in 1996 was below 10 percent (8.4 percent,
SCB).
Hansen and Lofstrom (1999) also show that refugees as a group are less likely to
move out of welfare than the native population; still after 20 years in Sweden both
refugee and non-refugee immigrants show higher social assistance participation rates
than statistically similar indigenous Swedes.
Our descriptive data shows that the average size of the annual refugee placement
to a municipality, during the period we study, was equal to ￿ve percent of the pool of
welfare recipients. Provided that many of the refugees stayed on welfare also after the
compensating ￿nancial grant had run out, as suggested by the studies cited above,
we can conclude that the e⁄ect on the welfare costs must have been quite substantial,
at least for the municipalities in the upper part of the distribution.
This suggests that even though the municipalities were to some extent compen-
sated for the refugee placement, we can expect some of the costs to remain after the
compensation period. The fact that the municipalities were provided compensation
for the ￿rst three to four years of the placement, furthermore suggests that the e⁄ect
is probably lagged, and, in the baseline analysis, we will use the number of refugees
placed in t ￿ 3 and t ￿ 4 as instruments.20
It hence seems like the refugee placement program lead to an increase in the pool
de￿ned broadly as a foreign citizen or as a Swedish citizen if a Swedish citizenship is obtained (a
refugee can obtain a Swedish citizenship at the earliest after four years).
20It can be noted that several of the Swedish municipalities that found themselves in ￿nancial
trouble during the 1990s, claim that one of the main explanations to the ￿nancial situation in their
municipality was due to increased costs in the wake of the refugee placement program. Also, several
of the municipalities claim that they had been undercompensated in the ￿rst place, indicating that
the in￿ow of refugees might have lead to a real cost for the municipalities earlier than three to four
years after the placement. Therefore, we will, in the sensitivity analysis, examine how sensitive the
baseline results are to di⁄erent lags on the instruments.
Since 1994 is the last year of the panel, all the observations on refugees in the baseline analysis are
from the period under which the implementation of the refugee placement program was the strictest
(i.e., up until 1991). This is an advantage, considering the exogeneity of the instruments.
16of welfare dependent inhabitants and to increased costs in the municipalities.21
4.3 Refugee migration
As noted in the theoretical framework, the appropriateness of using the refugee place-
ment program as an instrument for the neighboring municipalities￿bene￿t level hinges
on the migration elasticity of the refugees. Ideally, we wish that the refugees stay in
the municipality in which they were initially placed (c.f. Figure 1). Otherwise, some
of the cost e⁄ect may "spill over" directly through the migration of the refugees, which
implies that some of the e⁄ect on BA of the refugee placement in region B is a direct
cost e⁄ect, and not a result of interactions on bene￿t levels.
How large is the risk of direct cost spill-overs between municipalities from refugee
migration? This can be evaluated by looking at the migration pattern of refugees
during our sample period. This information is unfortunately not directly available,
but we can obtain an approximation by using sample data on the total immigration
(refugees and non-refugees) to Sweden. The sample consists of approximately 20
percent of the immigrants to Sweden during 1987-89. Following ¯slund (2000) and
Edin et al. (2003), we exclude observations of immigrants originating from OECD-
countries and a number of additional western European countries from the sample,
in an attempt to remove the non-refugee immigrants from the sample. In addition,
immigration of relatives of the refugees has been removed from the sample. We are
left with a sample of 9,283 observations, which is indeed roughly equal to 20 percent
of the total number of refugees during the period.22
In the data we can observe the municipality of residence for the refugees during
the year of arrival, and four years after arrival. The sample hence informs us of the
migration pattern of the refugees between these time periods.
Looking at some descriptive statistics, we see that 9,080 of the 9,283 refugees were
still living in Sweden four years after the initial placement (i.e., 203 of the refugees
had either migrated from Sweden or died). Out of the 9,080, 60.5 percent were still
living in the municipality in which they were initially placed. This means that 3,589
refugees had changed municipality after four years. Where had they moved?
It turns out that it is the three big towns in Sweden (Stockholm, Malm￿, and
G￿teborg) and their surrounding areas that are the main magnets. Out of the refugees
that had changed municipality, the majority (68 percent) had moved to or within one
of the counties of these three towns; the Stockholm, Malm￿ and V￿stra G￿taland
counties (roughly 60 percent of them had moved from counties other than these three,
21If the instruments are relevant empirically will be examined through the ￿rst-stage estimates in
the results section.
22The number of granted residence permits over the period 1987-89 for refugees were 55046 (The
Immigration Board).
17and approximately 40 percent had moved within or between these counties). We can
conclude that the main migration ￿ ows are to these counties.
Since we use neighboring municipalities as each municipality￿ s reference group,
our instrument is especially sensitive to refugee migration between neigboring munic-
ipalities. In our sample, such migration is rare; only 624 of the refugees have moved
to a neighboring municipality after four years. This is equal to 6.7 percent of the
total sample, or 17 percent of those that have moved. 367 of them had moved to or
within the Stockholm, Malm￿ and V￿stra G￿taland counties.
Three conclusions can be drawn from these descriptive statistics. First, even after
four years, the majority of the refugees (60.5 percent) is still living in the municipality
in which they were initially placed. Second, only a small fraction of the total number
of refugees that arrived four years earlier, had moved to a neighboring municipality.
This implies that the risk that our results su⁄er from bias stemming from direct "cost
spillovers" between the municipalities is small. Third, out of those that after four
years had migrated within Sweden, the great majority had moved to or within one of
the three big city counties in Sweden: the Stockholm, Malm￿ and V￿stra G￿taland
counties. This means that if there is any "cost shifting" going on, it is mainly the
three big cities and the surrounding areas that are bearing these costs.
The fact that the migration between neighboring municipalities seems to be small
suggests that the risk of direct cost spill-overs is probably small. Furthermore, the
majority of the refugees remain in the municipality of placement four years after
arrival. We will therefore initially conduct the analysis without taking account of
municipality-wise refugee migration. We will, however, test for the robustness of
the results to secondary migration by presenting estimation results when the three
migration-magnet counties are excluded.
5 Data and econometric considerations
5.1 Data
The reaction function derived in the theoretical model is estimated using data on the
280 municipalities￿generosity in providing welfare bene￿ts over the years 1990-94.23
The reason for starting in 1990 is that we have to use the number of refugees in
earlier periods as instruments (the longest lag is t￿4; see below). Since we only have
information on refugee placement from 1986, the ￿rst year in which we can use the
welfare bene￿t levels is 1990.
23Seven municipalities (Gnesta, Trosa, Nyk￿ping, Bollebygd, Bor￿s, Lekeberg och ￿rebro) were
excluded since they had been involved in either secessions or mergers of municipalities in the time
period 1989-1994. The municipality of Gotland was excluded since it is an island and consequently
has no border-sharing neighboring municipalities.
18There are a couple of potential candidates for measuring the bene￿t generosity of
a municipality. One is the norm that regulates the amount of bene￿ts that a person
is eligible for, the other is the actual bene￿t expenditures. We choose to focus on
the bene￿t expenditures in the baseline analysis. There are a couple of reasons for
this. First and foremost, it enables us to use a longer panel (data on expenditures
is available for several years, while data on the bene￿t norm is only available for the
years 1991, 1992 and 1994). In addition, by using bene￿t expenditures rather than
the bene￿t norm, we avoid the risk of distortions based on imperfect implementation
of the norm.24 We believe that our de￿nition of the welfare bene￿t level takes us
closer to the "true generosity" of the municipalities.25
The typical procedure in the literature is to normalize the welfare expenditures
by the number of bene￿t recipients. The drawback with that de￿nition is that it is
a rough measure, in the sense that it does not pick up variations in the time that
a person spends on welfare - i.e. a person that is on welfare at some point during
a year counts as a bene￿t recipient, regardless of the number of months he or she
receives bene￿ts. An alternative, and in this respect more precise, measure is to
normalize the bene￿t expenditures by the total number of bene￿t months. Therefore,
we have chosen to normalize by the number of bene￿t months, since this strikes us as a
more straightforward and intuitive measure, but will in the sensitivity analysis check
that the results obtained in the baseline estimations are robust to the alternative
normalizing factor.
During the period we study, the municipalities were free to set their own bene￿t
norms.26 From Table 1 it is clear that this decentralized decision-making in the
setting of welfare generosity led to a large variation in the bene￿ts paid out; the mean
bene￿ts paid out per bene￿t month was 3,960 SEK, with a standard deviation of 600
SEK (and with a minimum of 2,000 and a maximum of 7,900 SEK).27 In fact, it was
the great variation between the municipalities, in particular the tendency to set the
levels below the recommendations of the Board, that ￿nally led to the introduction
of a mandatory minimum level in 1998 (The National Board of Health and Welfare
(1999)).
24There has been a discussion in Sweden that there is an heterogenous implementation of the
bene￿t norm, both within and between municipalities.
25In the sensitivity analysis, we will however examine whether the results are sensitive to this by
re-estimating the model using the norm instead of expenditures.
26There was no mandatory rule for the bene￿t levels, but general guidelines were provided by The
National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen).
27All monetary variables are de￿ated to 1990 year values. There was also a signi￿cant variation
in the bene￿t norms set by the municipalities. During the years 1991, 1992 and 1994 (which are
the years for which we have information about the norms), the bene￿t norm averaged 112, with
minimum and maximum levels at 80 and 145 and with a standard deviation of 7.8. (The norm is
de￿ned as the percentage of the basic amount and we have used the unadjusted levels for a single
individual.).
19Descriptive statistics on the covariates are also given in Table 1. The covariates are
unemployment, tax base, grants from the central government, population 19-29, and
housing vacancies. Bene￿t level, tax base and grants are measured in 1000 SEK, while
the rest of the covariates are given in percent. These are variables that have been
included in similar studies and/or that we, based on Swedish welfare data, believe
likely to a⁄ect the bene￿t expenditures.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Bene￿t Level 1393 3.96 0.6 2 7.9
Unemployment 1400 4.5 2.6 0.2 12.2
Tax Base 1400 659 98 463 1366
Grants 1400 48 101 -1496 1531
Population 19-29 1400 13.9 1.8 10 23
Vacant Rentals 1377 3.9 4.2 0 31
Since we have to consider lagged e⁄ects when using the number of refugees received
by the municipalities to instrument for the bene￿t level, we will use refugee data for the
years 1986-1994. The overall mean number of refugees received by the municipalities
over the period 1986-1994 was 84. In the analysis we will use the number of refugees
normalized by the population in the municipality. The annual refugee placement to
a municipality during the period equalled 0.3 percent of the population. Normalizing
with the number of welfare recipients in the municipality, the corresponding number
is 5.5 percent.
5.2 Econometric considerations
Before turning to the results, we will discuss how the econometric model shall be
speci￿ed, what we must control for and why, and how the reference group shall be
de￿ned.
For the empirical work to be trustworthy when estimating the reaction function
derived in equation (8), there are some aspects that must be considered.
One such aspect is the distinction between endogenous and exogenous interactions.
As discussed in the introduction, to be able to identify the two channels separately, we
must control both for the other municipalities￿welfare bene￿t levels and for the char-
acteristics of the other municipalities, while we use the suggested policy intervention
to solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game.
Another important aspect to be considered is confounding e⁄ects such as het-
erogeneity and correlated shocks that might induce a spurious correlation between a
municipality￿ s bene￿t level and the bene￿t levels of its reference group. To control for
unobserved heterogeneity, we control for both municipality-speci￿c and time-speci￿c
￿xed e⁄ects. The municipality-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects will pick up any unobserved and
20unchanging characteristics of a municipality that are both related to its bene￿t level
and the bene￿t levels in the municipalities that form its reference group. The time
speci￿c e⁄ects will pick up any unobserved macro e⁄ects that a⁄ect all local govern-
ments in the same way.
There may also be idiosyncratic shocks that could induce a spurious correlation.
To control for such shocks, we include time-varying municipality-speci￿c measures as
the unemployment rate, income variables, and parts of the demographic structure.
As discussed by Manski (1993), we must control for correlated e⁄ects in order to
properly identify the social interaction e⁄ect. Since the reference group is ￿xed, and
since we control for ￿xed municipality e⁄ects, any unobserved time invariant charac-
teristics of the municipality￿ s reference group will not be part of the identi￿cation of
the strategic interaction e⁄ect. We will also include reference group characteristics,
i.e., group means of the set of covariates described earlier. These reference group
speci￿c characteristics thus control for correlated shocks within reference groups.28
In our case, as discussed earlier, we must also control for the number of vacant
housing. If the number of vacant housing in a municipality a⁄ects the amount of
refugees the municipality will receive, and if the number of vacant rentals is correlated
with the welfare bene￿t level in the municipality, then omitting to control for the
number of vacant rentals might induce a spurious correlation between the number of
refugees and the bene￿t level.29
Next we turn to the question of how the reference group shall be speci￿ed. That
is, which municipalities play welfare games with each other? It seems reasonable to
assume that the municipalities￿fear of welfare immigration from other municipalities
is stronger the closer these municipalities are. Since the welfare recipients may have
better information about the welfare generosity in nearby municipalities and since
migration costs increase with distance, it also seems more likely that welfare recipients
have a stronger migration response to di⁄erences in nearby municipalities than to
di⁄erences in municipalities further away.30 Furthermore, it seems reasonable to
use a geographical de￿nition of reference group since this captures the idea that
geographical neighbors belong to the same media market and that they therefore
have good information about the generosity of neighboring states.31
28There are hence two reasons why the neighboring municipalities￿characteristics should be in-
cluded as regressors in the model: First, they must be included since we might have exogenous as well
as endogenous interactions. Omitting any one of them might hence yield biased estimates. Second,
they must be included to control for any correlated shocks within reference groups.
29It can however be noted that the number of vacant rentals is close to a municipality-speci￿c
￿xed e⁄ect, implying that this might already be controlled for by the ￿xed e⁄ect speci￿cation.
30These arguments are put forward by Saavedra (2000). As noted earlier, also Figlio et al. (1999)
adopt a state￿ s neighbors as the relevant reference group.
31For example, Besley and Case (1995) also use this de￿nition of reference group in their empirical
analysis of social interaction e⁄ects in the form of tax competition between neighboring U.S. States.
21The richest model speci￿cation to be estimated is then given by
Bit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿B(￿i)t + Xit￿ + X(￿i)t￿ + "it (14)
where Bit is the welfare bene￿t level in municipality i in time period t, ￿i is a
municipality-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿t is a time speci￿c e⁄ect, B(￿i)t is the average
welfare bene￿t level among municipality i￿ s neighbors, Xit is a vector of time varying
municipality-speci￿c characteristics, X(￿i)t is a vector of average time varying charac-
teristics of the geographical neighbors, and "it is an error term. In the empirical part,
we will estimate four di⁄erent speci￿cations of equation (14). These speci￿cations
will be discussed in the next section.
6 Results
In this section we present our results. First, we present, for comparative reasons,
the OLS results. This is followed by the results of the ￿rst stage estimates in the
two-stage procedure. Finally, we present our IV-estimates that measure the causal
e⁄ect of the welfare generosity of neighboring municipalities on the welfare generosity
of a certain municipality. In all cases, we will consider four di⁄erent speci￿cations.
In speci￿cation I, we only control for time dummies and municipality-speci￿c ￿xed
e⁄ects. In speci￿cation II, we also control for the number of housing vacancies in
the municipalities.32 In speci￿cation III, we add the observable characteristics of a
municipality. In speci￿cation IV, ￿nally, we add all observable characteristics of a
municipality and its neighbors.
6.1 OLS results
For comparative reasons, we initially neglect simultaneity and start by estimating the
model without using instruments. As can be seen from Table 2, neighbors￿bene￿t
level enters signi￿cantly and with a positive sign; if neighbors decrease their welfare
bene￿t level with 100 SEK per bene￿t month, a municipality decreases its bene￿t
level with approximately 36 SEK per bene￿t month (c.f. column (4)). Also, in
line with our argumentation, the number of refugees in t ￿ 3 and t ￿ 4 signi￿cantly
a⁄ects the welfare generosity of the municipalities; the more refugees per capita that
32The number of housing vacancies is used as control variables among the neighbors￿characteristics
not to disturb the validity of the instruments (as discussed earlier). Using the number of housing
vacancies as a control variable in each municipality does not change the results at all. As a matter
of fact, the housing vacancies in each municipality always enter insigni￿cantly when included in the
speci￿cation. This is probably due to the fact that, as noted earlier, the variable is close to a ￿xed
e⁄ect.
22a municipality received three to four years earlier, the lower is the welfare bene￿t level
today.
Table 2: Estimating the model without instrumenting neighbors￿bene￿t level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors￿bene￿t level .46￿￿￿ .468￿￿￿ .382￿￿￿ .358￿￿￿
(.077) (.076) (.065) (.065)
Refugees (t ￿ 3) -.563￿￿￿ -.546￿￿￿
(.15) (.15)




















Vacant rentals (t ￿ 3) .013 .011 .005
(.017) (.017) (.017)
Vacant rentals (t ￿ 4) -.01 -.023 -.023
(.016) (.015) (.016)
Fixed e⁄ects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1393 1388 1374 1369
R2 .681 .685 .713 .716
6.2 First stage estimates
In the ￿rst stage regression in the IV approach, we run the average welfare bene￿t
level in neighboring municipalities (the endogenous variable) on the instruments (the
average number of refugees that was placed in the neighboring municipalities, mea-
sured as share of the population, in t ￿ 3 and t ￿ 4). The reduced form estimates of
the endogenous variable on the instruments provide information about the relevance
of the instruments. These results are presented in Table 3. As can be seen from the
results in the ￿rst two rows, there is a signi￿cant and negative association between the
number of refugees and the generosity in the setting of welfare bene￿ts; the higher the
average placement of refugees among the neighboring municipalities in t￿3 and t￿4,
the lower is the average welfare bene￿t level among the neighboring municipalities in
23t. The instruments hence seem to be relevant.
Table 3: First stage estimates. Dependent variable: Neighbors￿bene￿t level. Ex-
cluded instrument: Refugees per capita received by neighboring municipalities in t -
3 and t - 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors￿refugees (t ￿ 3) -1.049￿￿￿ -.997￿￿￿ -.938￿￿￿ -1.006￿￿￿
(.15) (.143) (.146) (.151)
Neighbors￿refugees (t ￿ 4) -.514￿￿￿ -.605￿￿￿ -.733￿￿￿ -.855￿￿￿
(.137) (.143) (.128) (.131)
Refugees (t ￿ 3) -.16￿￿￿ -.131￿￿
(.06) (.06)




















Vacant rentals (t ￿ 3) .034￿￿￿ .034￿￿￿ .028￿￿￿
(.011) (.01) (.011)
Vacant rentals (t ￿ 4) -.063￿￿￿ -.067￿￿￿ -.067￿￿￿
(.011) (.01) (.01)
Fixed e⁄ects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1399 1394 1380 1376
R2 .802 .812 .822 .83
Regarding the strength of the instruments, we do not have any indications that our
instruments are weak. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest using the F-statistic for the
joint signi￿cance of the excluded instruments in the ￿rst-stage equation as a diagnostic
of the power of the instruments. They argue that if the F-statistic is larger than 10,
there should be no problem associated with weak instruments. Conducting partial
F-tests on the excluded instruments in the ￿rst-stage regression, we get F-statistics
that are in the interval 33-40 for the four speci￿cations.
246.3 IV estimates
The two-stage least squares estimates are presented in Table 4. As can be seen from
the ￿rst row, there is a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect from the setting of welfare ben-
e￿t levels in neighboring municipalities on the setting of the welfare bene￿t level in
a given municipality. The point estimates indicate that if the neighboring municipal-
ities decrease their welfare bene￿t level with 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its
bene￿t level with approximately 59 SEK (c.f. speci￿cation (4)). The estimates for
neighbors￿bene￿t level hence provide indications of strategic interactions among the
local governments in the setting of welfare bene￿t levels, implying that there exists a
"race-to-the-bottom".33
Since we have an overidenti￿ed model, we can use a test for overidentifying re-
strictions to test for instrument validity/correct model speci￿cation. From the Hansen
J-statistic, presented in the last row of Table 4, it is clear that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of valid instruments/correct model speci￿cation.
Turning to the other explanatory variables, it is clear from speci￿cations (3) and
(4) that the number of refugees received by a municipality in t ￿ 3 and t ￿ 4 both
have a signi￿cant and negative e⁄ect on the municipality￿ s welfare bene￿t level in
t, which is in line with the main argument of this paper. The municipality￿ s tax
base, unemployment rate, intergovernmental grants received from the central level,
and population aged 19-29 do however not seem to have any signi￿cant impacts on
the municipality￿ s welfare generosity.
An interesting thing to note is that several of the neighboring municipalities￿
characteristics (unemployment rate, grants and tax base) enter signi￿cantly, indi-
cating that there might be exogenous social interactions. The implication is that
the "other" local governments￿characteristics are not suitable as instruments for the
"other" local governments￿bene￿t level.
33The IV-estimates are somewhat higher than the OLS estimates (c.f. Table 2), but they are not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the OLS estimates.
25Table 4: IV estimates for baseline speci￿cation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors￿bene￿t level .864￿￿￿ .838￿￿￿ .506￿￿￿ .589￿￿￿
(.207) (.205) (.158) (.161)
Refugees (t ￿ 3) -.524￿￿￿ -.478￿￿￿
(.152) (.15)




















Vacant rentals (t ￿ 3) .002 .008 0
(.019) (.018) (.018)
Vacant rentals (t ￿ 4) .01 -.016 -.008
(.017) (.017) (.017)
Fixed e⁄ects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1392 1387 1373 1369
R2 .663 .671 .711 .711
Hansen J-statistic 0.370 0.307 2.022 1.536
(p-value) (0.543) (0.579) (0.155) (0.215)
7 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we will conduct several sensitivity analyses to check the robustness
of the baseline results obtained in the previous section. In particular, we will ex-
amine how sensitive the results are to (i) migration among refugees, (ii) di⁄erent
lag structures on the instrument (i.e., di⁄erent lag lengths on the refugee variable),
(iii) di⁄erent de￿nitions of the welfare generosity variable, and (iv) potential serial
correlation in the error process.
7.1 Migration among refugees
As suggested by the theoretical model, the policy intervention may not provide a valid
instrument if the secondary migration of refugees (i.e., any migration that takes place
after the initial placement) among municipalities is large. Our choice of instruments
26is motivated by the fact that refugees that arrive to a municipality are statistically
likely to become recipients of welfare, and hence increase the welfare bene￿t costs of
the municipality. This, of course, hinges on the assumption that the refugees stay in
the municipality in which they were initially placed. It is hence of great importance
to test the robustness of the results to such migration.
The descriptive statistics on refugee migration showed that the migration ￿ ows of
the refugees during the time period we study were ￿rst and foremost directed towards
the counties of the three largest towns, the Stockholm, Malm￿ and V￿stra G￿taland
counties. Furthermore, out of the 624 persons in the sample that had migrated to a
neighboring municipality, more than half (367) had moved to municipalities in these
counties. A straightforward sensitivity analysis is to re-estimate the model without
these counties. If the baseline results are biased because of secondary refugee migra-
tion, excluding these observations will provide a model with more valid instruments.34
The results of the IV-estimation, excluding the municipalities of the three "big city
counties" are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that excluding the counties that are the main "migration magnets"
does not substantially change the results. The coe¢ cients of the neighbors￿bene￿t
level are signi￿cant in all model speci￿cations and are very close to those obtained in
the baseline speci￿cation (c.f. Table 4). As expected, the Hansen J-statistic is smaller
(the p-value is higher) when the three migration magnets are excluded. We conclude
that the baseline results do not seem to be a⁄ected by the migration of the refugees.
7.2 Di⁄erent lag structures on the instrument
Next, we will investigate how sensitive the baseline results are to di⁄erent lag struc-
tures on the instrument (i.e., on refugees). In the baseline estimations we used the
average number of refugees in t￿3 and t￿4 as instruments. What happens if we use
other lags or combinations of di⁄erent lags? The results when we use di⁄erent sets
of instruments are presented in Table 6. In Table 6 we only report the coe¢ cient for
the neighboring municipalities￿bene￿t level, implying that each cell corresponds to
a separate regression. The covariates used in each regression are the same as those
used earlier for speci￿cations (1)-(4).35
The ￿rst row in Table 6 simply replicates the baseline estimates (i.e., it shows the
results when we use the number of refugees in t￿3 and t￿4 as instruments). When
we use the instruments lagged t ￿ 2, t ￿ 3, and t ￿ 4, we get signi￿cant estimates
34It shall be noted that the municipalities are only dropped as dependent variables, i.e. they are
kept when we compute the neighbors￿bene￿t levels and characteristics. We do this to minimize the
distortion of the exclusion of the observations of the big city counties.
35We have also experimented with one lag on the instrument, but the test for overidentifying
restrictions always reject the null hypothesis when the number of refugees in t ￿ 1 is used as an
instrument. This is in line with expectations given how the program was set up.
27Table 5: Sensitivity analysis: IV estimates when the counties of Stockholm, Malm￿
and V￿stra G￿taland are excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors￿bene￿t level .83￿￿￿ .823￿￿￿ .58￿￿￿ .646￿￿￿
(.202) (.204) (.169) (.174)
Refugees (t ￿ 3) -.598￿￿￿ -.538￿￿￿
(.174) (.17)




















Vacant rentals (t ￿ 3) .007 .01 .002
(.025) (.024) (.024)
Vacant rentals (t ￿ 4) .001 -.008 -.004
(.021) (.02) (.021)
Fixed e⁄ects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 873 868 862 858
R2 .622 .63 .683 .684
Hansen J-statistic 0.137 0.060 1.157 0.472
(p-value) (0.711) (0.807) (0.282) (0.492)
in the same order of magnitude as in the baseline estimations (c.f. the second row).
From the last three rows, we note that when the instrument lagged t ￿ 2, t ￿ 3, and
t￿4 are used one at a time, we get signi￿cant estimates in all cases but one, and the
estimates are in the same order of magnitude as in the baseline estimations.
It can also be worth mentioning that when we test the validity of the instruments,
using the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions, the results suggest that any
combination of the lags t ￿ 2, t ￿ 3, and t ￿ 4 produces exogenous instruments.
7.3 Di⁄erent de￿nitions of welfare generosity
Next, we will examine how sensitive the baseline results are to alternative de￿nitions
of the welfare generosity variable. In particular, we will examine what happens if we
use the bene￿t norm or welfare expenditures per bene￿ciary instead of welfare ex-
28Table 6: Sensitivity analysis: Di⁄erent lag lengths on the instruments. Only the
coe¢ cient of the neighboring municipalities bene￿t level is presented.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t ￿ 3;t ￿ 4 .864￿￿￿ .838￿￿￿ .506￿￿￿ .589￿￿￿
(.207) (.205) (.158) (.161)
t ￿ 2;t ￿ 3;t ￿ 4 .877￿￿￿ .867￿￿￿ .599￿￿￿ .649￿￿￿
(.213) (.214) (.174) (.173)
t ￿ 2 .969￿￿￿ .96￿￿￿ .962￿￿ .937￿￿
(.36) (.36) (.381) (.381)
t ￿ 3 .908￿￿￿ .88￿￿￿ .641￿￿￿ .71￿￿￿
(.214) (.215) (.195) (.198)
t ￿ 4 .763￿￿￿ .753￿￿￿ .304 .439￿￿
(.294) (.288) (.222) (.211)
penditures per bene￿t month. Starting by looking at simple correlations between the
three measures of welfare generosity, it is obvious that the bene￿t norm is only slightly
correlated with the two expenditures measures, while the correlation between the two
expenditures measures is much higher (c.f. Table 7). This indicates that the norm
is not perfectly implemented, as discussed earlier.36 The IV estimates for the three
alternative de￿nitions of the municipalities￿welfare generosity is presented in Table
8. In Table 8 we only report the coe¢ cient for the neighboring municipalities￿bene￿t
level, implying that each cell corresponds to a separate regression. The covariates
used in each regression are the same as those used earlier for speci￿cations (1)-(4).37
When using the welfare expenditures per bene￿ciary, we note from the middle row
that we get very similar results as those in the baseline estimation (c.f. the last row).
When using the bene￿t norm, we get point estimates that are much higher than in
the baseline estimations, even though they are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each
other. In all cases, the estimated e⁄ects are however signi￿cant, indicating that the
baseline conclusion of strategic interaction among the municipalities in the setting of
welfare bene￿t levels does not hinge on the way the welfare bene￿t level was de￿ned.
Table 7: Correlations between the three measures of welfare generosity
Bene￿t norm Exp./bene￿ciary Exp./bene￿t month
Bene￿t norm 1
Expenditures/bene￿ciary -0.018 1
Expenditures/bene￿t month -0.014 0.746 1
36This pattern is also observed by Hernes Fiva and Rattsł (2003) on Norwegian data.
37A di⁄erence is that we only have information about the bene￿t norm for the years 1991, 1992
and 1994, implying that we have fewer observations in those estimations (from 768 in speci￿cations
(3) and (4) to 777 in speci￿cation (1)).
29Table 8: Sensitivity analysis: Alternative de￿nitions of the welfare bene￿t level. Only
the coe¢ cient of the neighboring municipalities bene￿t level is presented.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bene￿t norm 1.438￿￿￿ 1.327￿￿￿ 1.503￿￿￿ 1.731￿￿
(.499) (.499) (.575) (.857)
Expenditures per bene￿ciary .824￿￿￿ .821￿￿￿ .63￿￿￿ .658￿￿￿
(.118) (.118) (.114) (.119)
Expenditures per bene￿t month .864￿￿￿ .838￿￿￿ .506￿￿￿ .589￿￿￿
(.207) (.205) (.158) (.161)
7.4 Serial correlation in the error process
In the baseline analysis, we implicitly assumed that there is no serial correlation in
the welfare bene￿t level. However, if there is such a correlation in the error process,
the resulting standard errors are inconsistently estimated and may lead to severely
biased estimates in small samples (see, e.g., KØzdi (2002) and Bertrand, Du￿ o and
Mullainathan (2004)). To examine the sensitivity of the baseline speci￿cation to this,
we re-estimated a model in which we allowed the errors to be correlated over time
within each municipality.38 From the results, presented in Table 9, it is clear that the
baseline results are robust to this re-speci￿cation.
7.5 Some additional sensitivity analyses
In addition to the above discussed sensitivity analyses, we have checked the robust-
ness of the baseline estimates to: (i) another functional form (using a semi-logarithmic
speci￿cation), (ii) the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side
(estimating the model in ￿rst di⁄erences), (iii) the inclusion of lagged covariates (but
no lag on the dependent variable). In none of these three cases do we reach other
conclusions than those of the baseline analysis. We have also examined how sensi-
tive the baseline results are to an alternative normalization of the refugees variable:
Normalizing the number of refugees with the number of individuals on welfare in the
municipality instead of normalizing it with the municipality￿ s entire population yields
almost identical results as in the baseline case.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate whether local governments react on the welfare bene￿t
levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own bene￿t levels. The main
contribution of the paper is that we suggest and use a speci￿c policy intervention as
an instrument to solve the simultaneity problem that arises from the welfare game
that the local governments play; a centrally geared placement of a highly welfare
38Technically, this was done in STATA by clustering on municipality.
30Table 9: Allowing for autocorrelation in the residuals (cluster on municipality)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors￿bene￿t level .864￿￿￿ .838￿￿￿ .506￿￿ .589￿￿￿
(.294) (.292) (.204) (.206)
Refugees (t ￿ 3) -.524￿￿￿ -.478￿￿￿
(.177) (.172)




















Vacant rentals (t ￿ 3) .002 .008 0
(.023) (.021) (.021)
Vacant rentals (t ￿ 4) .01 -.016 -.008
(.021) (.02) (.02)
Fixed e⁄ects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1392 1387 1373 1369
R2 .663 .671 .711 .711
prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities. Using a policy intervention
as instrument allows us to separate between endogenous and exogenous interactions
(and, in addition, to better control for any correlated shocks over local governments).
This has not been done earlier in the literature.
We argue in the paper that given that one controls for the number of vacant
apartments in the municipality and for municipality-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, the refugee
placement can be considered as exogenous. Furthermore, we show, in a theoretical
framework following the work of Brueckner (2000), Brown and Oates (1987), and
Wildasin (1991), that, given certain assumptions, it is appropriate to use the refugee
placement program as an instrument since the refugee placement program shifts the
neighboring local governments￿reaction function while holding the reaction function
of my local government ￿xed (implying that the e⁄ect on my bene￿t level is only
channeled trough the bene￿t level of the neighboring jurisdictions).
In the empirical application we use panel data for Swedish municipalities. In
31addition to controlling for observable characteristics of the municipalities, we control
for both municipality-speci￿c and time-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. In the baseline analysis,
we ￿nd a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect from the setting of welfare bene￿t levels
in neighboring municipalities on the setting of the welfare bene￿t level in a given
municipality. The point estimates indicate that if the neighboring municipalities
decrease their welfare bene￿t level with 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its bene￿t
level with approximately 59 SEK. The estimates for neighbors￿bene￿t level hence
provide indications of strategic interactions among the local governments in the setting
of welfare bene￿t levels, implying that there exists a "race-to-the-bottom". These
results seem to be robust to several alternative model speci￿cations.
In addition, we ￿nd that some exogenous interactions seem to be at work, in-
dicating that neighboring jurisdictions￿characteristics are not generally valid as in-
struments when trying to solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare
game.
The policy intervention that we suggest and use as an instrument in this paper is
not unique for Sweden. Similar programs exist in other countries, and we believe that
the use of such programs can be a fruitful way of approaching the problem encountered
in models of welfare competition.
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